In Defence of the Self-Signed Certificate

Recently I discussed using EFS as a simple, yet reliable, form of file encryption. Among the doubts raised was the following from an article by fellow MVP Deb Shinder on EFS:

EFS generates a self-signed certificate. However, there are problems inherent in using self-signed certificates:

  • Unlike a certificate issued by a trusted third party (CA), a self-signed certificate signifies only self-trust. It’s sort of like relying on an ID card created by its bearer, rather than a government-issued card. Since encrypted files aren’t shared with anyone else, this isn’t really as much of a problem as it might at first appear, but it’s not the only problem.
  • If the self-signed certificate’s key becomes corrupted or gets deleted, the files that have been encrypted with it can’t be decrypted. The user can’t request a new certificate as he could do with a CA.

Well, she’s right, but that only really gives a part of the picture, and it verges on out-and-out recommending that self-signed certificates are completely untrustworthy. Certainly that’s how self-signed certificates are often viewed.

Let’s take the second item first, shall we?

“Request a new certificate” isn’t quite as simple as all that. If the user has deleted, or corrupted, the private key, and didn’t save a copy, then requesting a new certificate will merely allow the user to encrypt new files, and won’t let them recover old files. [The exception is, of course, if you use something called "Key Recovery" at your certificate authority (CA) - but that's effectively an automated "save a copy".]

Even renewing a certificate changes its thumbprint, so to decrypt your old EFS-encrypted files, you should keep your old EFS certificates and private keys around, or use CIPHER to re-encrypt with current certificates.

So, the second point is dependent on whether the CA has set up Key Recovery – this isn’t a problem if you make a copy of your certificate and private key, onto removable storage. And keep it very carefully stored away.

As to the first point – you (or rather, your computer) already trust dozens of self-signed certificates. Without them, Windows Update would not work, nor would many of the secured web sites that you use on a regular basis.


certmgr shows that all Trusted Root Certificates are self-signed.

Hey, look – they’ve all got the same thing in “Issued To” as they have in “Issued By”!

Yes, that’s right – every single “Trusted Root” certificate is self-signed!

If you’re new to PKI and cryptography, that’s going to seem weird – but a moment’s thought should set you at rest.

Every certificate must be signed. There must be a “first certificate” in any chain of signed certificates, and if that “first certificate” is signed by anyone other than itself, then it’s not the first certificate. QED.

The reason we trust any non-root certificate is that we trust the issuer to choose to sign only those certificates whose identity can be validated according to their policy.

So, if we can’t trust these trusted roots because of who they’re signed by, why should we trust them?

The reason we trust self-signed certificates is that we have a reason to trust them – and that reason is outside of the certificate and its signature. The majority (perhaps all) of the certificates in your Trusted Root Certificate Store come from Microsoft – they didn’t originate there, but they were distributed by Microsoft along with the operating system, and updates to the operating system.

You trusted the operating system’s original install disks implicitly, and that trust is where the trust for the Trusted Root certificates is rooted. That’s a trust outside of the certificate chains themselves.

So, based on that logic, you can trust the self-signed certificates that EFS issues in the absence of a CA, only if there is something outside of the certificate itself that you trust.

What could that be?

For me, it’s simple – I trust the operating system to generate the certificate, and I trust my operational processes that keep the private key associated with the EFS certificate secure.

There are other reasons to be concerned about using the self-signed EFS certificates that are generated in the absence of a CA, though, and I’ll address those in the next post on this topic.

2 thoughts on “In Defence of the Self-Signed Certificate”

  1. Thanks alun. It suddenly enlightened me to create new test cases testing scenarios after certificate renewal in our product. The hint was “certificate thumbprint changes…” It was so dumb of me not to realize this earlier :)

    Is there a way to renew certificates with Microsoft supplied IIS CA server?


  2. Didn’t know where to report. Connect site doesn’t accept bugs for Vista. Since you are an MVP…

    Bug: Assume EFS is configured. Search for some file. In the search results pane right click. “Encrypt” is shown in the context menu. When I click on it, nothing happens. So, why show the menu?

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