Security Questions are Bullshit


I’m pretty much unhappy with the use of “Security Questions” – things like “what’s your mother’s maiden name”, or “what was your first pet”. These questions are sometimes used to strengthen an existing authentication control (e.g. “you’ve entered your password on a device that wasn’t recognised, from a country you normally don’t visit – please answer a security question”), but far more often they are used as a means to recover an account after the password has been lost, stolen or changed.


I’ve been asked a few times, given that these are pretty widely used, to explain objectively why I have such little disregard for them as a security measure. Here’s the Too Long; Didn’t Read summary:

  1. Most questions are equivalent to a low-entropy password
  2. Answers to many of these questions can be found online in public documents
  3. Answers can be squeezed out of you, by fair means or foul
  4. The same questions – and answers – are shared at multiple sites
  5. Questions (and answers) don’t get any kind of regulatory protection
  6. Because the best answers are factual and unchanging, you cannot change them if they are exposed

Let’s take them one by one:

Questions are like a low-entropy password

What’s your favourite colour? Blue, or Green. At the outside, red, yellow, orange or purple. That covers most people’s choices, in less than 3 bits of entropy.

What’s your favourite NBA team? There’s 29 of those – 30, if you count the 76ers. That’s 6 bits of entropy.

Obviously, there are questions that broaden this, but are relatively easy to guess with a small number of tries – particularly when you can use the next fact about Security Questions.

The Answers are available online

What’s your mother’s maiden name? It’s a matter of public record.

What school did you go to? If we know where you grew up, it’s easy to guess this, since there were probably only a handful of schools you could possibly have attended.

Who was your first boyfriend/girlfriend? Many people go on about this at length in Facebook posts, I’m told. Or there’s this fact:

You’ll tell people the answers

What’s your porn name? What’s your Star Wars name? What’s your Harry Potter name?

All these stupid quizzes, and they get you to identify something about yourself – the street you grew up on, the first initial of your secret crush, how old you were when you first heard saxophones.

And, of course, because of the next fact, all I really have to do is convince you that you want a free account at my site.

Answers are shared everywhere

Every site that you visit asks you variants of the same security questions – which means that you’ll have told multiple sites the same answers.

You’ve been told over and over not to share your password across multiple sites – but here you are, sharing the security answers that will reset your password, and doing so across multiple sites that should not be connected.

And do you think those answers (and the questions they refer back to) are kept securely by these various sites? No, because:

Questions & Answers are not protected like passwords

There’s regulatory protection, under regimes such as PCI, etc, telling providers how to protect your passwords.

There is no such advice for protecting security questions (which are usually public) and the answers to them, which are at least presumed to be stored in a back-end database, but are occasionally sent to the client for comparison against the answers! That’s truly a bad security measure, because of course you’re telling the attacker.

Even assuming the security answers are stored in a database, they’re generally stored in plain text, so that they can be accessed by phone support staff to verify your answers when you call up crying that you’ve forgotten your password. [Awesome pen-testing trick]

And because the answers are shared everywhere, all it takes is a breach at one provider to make the security questions and answers they hold have no security value at all any more.

If they’re exposed, you can’t change them

There’s an old joke in security circles, “my password got hacked, and now I have to rename my dog”. It’s really funny, because there are so many of these security answers which are matters of historical fact – while you can choose different questions, you can’t generally choose a different answer to the same question.

Well, obviously, you can, but then you’ve lost the point of a security question and answer – because now you have to remember what random lie you used to answer that particular question on that particular site.

And for all you clever guys out there…

Yes, I know you can lie, you can put in random letters or phrases, and the system may take them (“Your place of birth cannot contain spaces” – so, Las Vegas, New York, Lake Windermere are all unusable). But then you’ve just created another password to remember – and the point of these security questions is to let you log on once you’ve forgotten your password.

So, you’ve forgotten your password, but to get it back, you have to remember a different password, one that you never used. There’s not much point there.

In summary

Security questions and answers, when used for password recovery / reset, are complete rubbish.

Security questions are low-entropy, predictable and discoverable password substitutes that are shared across multiple sites, are under- or un-protected, and (like fingerprints) really can’t be changed if they become exposed. This makes them totally unsuited to being used as password equivalents in account recovery / password reset schemes.

If you have to implement an account recovery scheme, find something better to use. In an enterprise, as I’ve said before, your best bet is to use something that the enterprise does well – the management hierarchy. Every time you forget your password, you have to get your manager, or someone at the next level up from them, to reset your password for you, or to vouch for you to tech support. That way, someone who knows you, and can affect your behaviour in a positive way, will know that you keep forgetting your password and could do with some assistance. In a social network, require the

Password hints are bullshit, too

Also, password hints are bullshit. Many of the Adobe breach’s “password hints” were actually just the password in plain-text. And, because Adobe didn’t salt their password hashes, you could sort the list of password hashes, and pick whichever of the password hints was either the password itself, or an easy clue for the password. So, even if you didn’t use the password hint yourself, or chose a really cryptic clue, some other idiot came up with the same password, and gave a “Daily Express Quick Crossword” quality clue.

6 Responses to Security Questions are Bullshit

  • King says:

    Agreed, I’ve said the same for many years. One should never give truthful answers because they become the weakest link into your account. But as you point out, if you lie (as I do), then you just get more passwords to manage. Yippee. And since some sites use security questions to “double check” that it’s you, you can’t just set them and forget them, either!

    Now many sites use pull-down menus, as shown in your example. This allows only a small number of choices that can easily be brute-forced! What are they thinking!? That’s a decrease in security from stupid to lethal.

    • alunj says:

      Many forms don’t explicitly force a pull-down list, but their choice of questions means that most users will choose from the same small menu as if the drop-down were in place.

  • Mariusz says:

    I came here to rant, just got a security question “Whats your favourite book” – it was required before I could login with my password.

    I have no f’n idea what my favourite book was way back when, or if its case sensitive, whether it includes the word The or not, or whether it includes apostrophes, or hyphens?

    What a f’king pain

  • Scott Crawford says:

    Excellent article and I agree with all of these points.

    One minor thing I think you’re missing though is that since there are instances where they can be “used to strengthen an existing authentication control”, there needs to be some indication of what they will be used for. If a site asks me my dogs name, I want to know if my answer can be used as a password substitution or not. Their use will dictate how I answer the question.

    I would love for security questions to just go away, but since they’ll stick around, sites need to tell us what they’ll use them for.

  • tom says:

    Make up the answers (assuming you’re allowed to) with randomness, and store it in the same password vault you store the password.

    • alunj says:

      As I said in the article, that just means you’ve effectively created another password, which needs storing / remembering, so if that’s your advice to users of your security questions, you’ve made it clear that security questions are not the answer to whatever problem you thought they were trying to solve. My goal here was not to provide advice to people who use security questions, but to people who implement them.

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