Sometimes I think that title is the job of the Security Engineer – as a Subject Matter Expert, we’re supposed to meet with teams and tell them how their dreams are going to come crashing down around their ears because of something they hadn’t thought of, but which is obvious to us.
This can make us just a little bit unpopular.
But being argumentative and sceptical isn’t entirely a bad trait to have.
Sometimes it comes in handy when other security guys spread their various statements of doom and gloom – or joy and excitement.
“Rename your administrator account so it’s more secure” – or lengthen the password and achieve the exact same effect without breaking scripts or requiring extra documentation so people know what the administrator is called this week.
“Encrypt your data at rest by using automatic database encryption” – which means any app that authenticates to the database can read that data back out, voiding the protection that was the point of encrypting at rest. If fields need encrypting, maybe they need field-level access control, too.
“Complex passwords, one lower case, one upper case, one number, one symbol, no repeated letters” – or else, measure strength in more interesting ways, and display to users how strong their password is, so that a longish phrase, used by a competent typist, becomes an acceptable password.
Now I’m going to commit absolute heresy, as I’m going against the biggest recent shock news in security advice.
I understand the arguments, and I know I’m frequently irritated with the unnecessary requirements to change my password after sixty days, and even more so, I know that the reasons behind password expiration settings are entirely arbitrary.
There’s a good side to password expiry.
These aren’t the only ways in which passwords are discovered.
The method that frequently gets overlooked is when they are deliberately shared.
“Bob’s out this week, because his mother died, and he has to arrange details in another state. He didn’t have time to set up access control changes before he left, but he gave me a sticky-note with his password on it, so that we don’t need to bother him for anything”
“Everyone on this team has to monitor and interact with so many shared service accounts, we just print off a list of all the service account passwords. You can photocopy my laminated card with the list, if you like.”
Yes, those are real situations I’ve dealt with, and they have some pretty obvious replacement solutions:
Bob (or Bob’s manager, if Bob is too distraught to talk to anyone, which isn’t at all surprising) should notify a system administrator who can then respond to requests to open up ACLs as needed, rather than someone using Bob’s password. But he didn’t.
When Bob comes back, is he going to change his password?
No, because he trusts his assistant, Dave, with his communications.
But, of course, Dave handed out his password to the sales VP, because it was easier for him than fetching up the document she wanted. And sales VPs just can’t be trusted. Now the entire sales team knows Bob’s password. And then one of them gets fired, or hired on at a new competitor. The temptation to log on to Bob’s account – just once – is immense, because that list of customers is just so enticing. And really, who would ever know? And if they did know, everyone has Bob’s password, so it’s not like they could prosecute you, because they couldn’t prove it was you.
What’s going to save Bob is if he is required to change his password when he returns.
Yes, this also happened. Because we found the photocopy of the laminated sheet folded up on the floor of a hallway outside the lavatory door.
There was some disciplining involved. Up to, and possibly including, the termination of employment, as policy allows.
Then the bad stuff happened.
The team who shared all these passwords pointed out that, as well as these being admin-level accounts, they had other special privileges, including the avoidance of any requirement to change passwords.
These passwords hadn’t changed in six years.
And the team had no idea what would break if they changed the passwords.
Maybe one of those passwords is hard-coded into a script somewhere, and vital business processes would grind to a halt if the password was changed.
When I left six months later, they were still (successfully) arguing that it would be too dangerous to try changing the passwords.
I’m not familiar with any company that acknowledges in policy that users share passwords, nor the expected behaviour when they do [log when you shared it, and who you shared it with, then change it as soon as possible after it no longer needs to be shared].
Once you accept that passwords are shared for valid reasons, even if you don’t enumerate what those reasons are, you can come up with processes and tools to make that sharing more secure.
If there was a process for Bob to share with Dave what his password is, maybe outlining the creation of a temporary password, reading Dave in on when Dave can share the password (probably never), and how Dave is expected to behave, and becomes co-responsible for any bad things done in Bob’s account, suddenly there’s a better chance Dave’s not going to share. “I can’t give you Bob’s password, but I can get you that document you’re after”
If there was a tool in which the team managing shared service accounts could find and unlock access to passwords, that tool could also be configured to distribute changed passwords to the affected systems after work had been performed.
If you don’t have these processes or tools, the only protection you have against password sharing (apart from the obviously failing advice to “just don’t do it”) is regular password expiry.
I’m also fond of talking about password expiration as being a means to train your users.
Certificates expire once a year, and as a result, programmers write code as if it’s never going to happen. After all, there’s plenty of time between now and next year to write the “renew certificate” logic, and by the time it’s needed, I’ll be working on another project anyway.
If passwords don’t expire – or don’t expire often enough – users will not have changed their password anything like recently enough to remember how to do so if they have to in an emergency.
So, when a keylogger has been discovered to be caching all the logons in the conference room, or the password hashes have been posted on Pastebin, most of your users – even the ones approving the company-wide email request for action – will fight against a password change request, because they just don’t know how to do it, or what might break when they do.
Unless they’ve been through it before, and it were no great thing. In which case, they’ll briefly sigh, and then change their password.
This is where I equivocate and say, yes, I broadly think the advice to reduce or remove password expiration is appropriate. My arguments above are mainly about things we’ve forgotten to remember that are reasons why we might have included password expiry to begin with.
Here, in closing, are some ways in which password expiry is bad, just to balance things out:
Right now, this is where we stand:
As a result, especially of this last item, I don’t think businesses can currently afford to remove password expiry from their accounts.
But any fool can see which way the wind is blowing – at some point, you will be able to excuse your company from password expiry, but just in case your compliance standard requires it, you should have a very clear and strong story about how you have addressed the risks that were previously resolved by expiring passwords as frequently as once a quarter.
There are many reasons why Information Security hasn’t had as big an impact as it deserves. Some are external – lack of funding, lack of concern, poor management, distractions from valuable tasks, etc, etc.
But the ones we inflict on ourselves are probably the most irritating. They make me really cross.
We shoot ourselves in the foot by confusing our customers between Cross-Site Scripting, Cross-Site Request Forgery & Cross-Frame Scripting.
— Alun Jones (@ftp_alun) February 26, 2016
OK, “cross” is an English term for “angry”, or “irate”, but as with many other English words, it’s got a few other meanings as well.
It can mean to wrong someone, or go against them – “I can’t believe you crossed Fingers MacGee”.
It can mean to make the sign of a cross – “Did you just cross your fingers?”
It can mean a pair of items, intersecting one another – “I’m drinking at the sign of the Skull and Cross-bones”.
It can mean to breed two different subspecies into a third – “What do you get if you cross a mountaineer with a mosquito? Nothing, you can’t cross a scaler and a vector.”
Or it can mean to traverse something – “I don’t care what Darth Vader says, I always cross the road here”.
It’s this last sense that InfoSec people seem obsessed about, to the extent that every other attack seems to require it as its first word.
These are just a list of the attacks at OWASP that begin with the word “Cross”.
Yesterday I had a meeting to discuss how to address three bugs found in a scan, and I swear I spent more than half the meeting trying to ensure that the PM and the Developer in the room were both discussing the same bug. [And here, I paraphrase]
“How long will it take you to fix the Cross-Frame Scripting bug?”
“We just told you, it’s going to take a couple of days.”
“No, that was for the Cross-Site Scripting bug. I’m talking about the Cross-Frame Scripting issue.”
“Oh, that should only take a couple of days, because all we need to do is encode the contents of the field.”
“No, again, that’s the Cross-Site Scripting bug. We already discussed that.”
“I wish you’d make it clear what you’re talking about.”
Yeah, me too.
The whole point of the word “Cross” as used in the descriptions of these bugs is to indicate that someone is doing something they shouldn’t – and in that respect, it’s pretty much a completely irrelevant word, because we’re already discussing attack types.
In many of these cases, the words “Cross-Site” bring absolutely nothing to the discussion, and just make things confusing. Am I crossing a site from one page to another, or am I saying this attack occurs between sites? What if there’s no other site involved, is that still a cross-site scripting attack? [Yes, but that’s an irrelevant question, and by asking it, or thinking about asking/answering it, you’ve reduced your mental processing abilities to handle the actual issue.]
Check yourself when you utter “cross” as the first word in the description of an attack, and ask if you’re communicating something of use, or just “sounding like a proper InfoSec tool”. Consider whether there’s a better term to use.
Cross-Frame Scripting is really Click-Jacking (and yes, that doesn’t exclude clickjacking activities done by a keyboard or other non-mouse source).
Cross-Site Request Forgery is more of a Forced Action – an attacker can guess what URL would cause an action without further user input, and can cause a user to visit that URL in a hidden manner.
Cross-Site History Manipulation is more of a browser failure to protect SOP – I’m not an expert in that field, so I’ll leave it to them to figure out a non-confusing name.
Cross-Site Tracing is just getting silly – it’s Cross-Site Scripting (excuse me, HTML Injection) using the TRACE verb instead of the GET verb. If you allow TRACE, you’ve got bigger problems than XSS.
Cross-User Defacement crosses all the way into crosstalk, requiring as it does that two users be sharing the same TCP connection with no adequate delineation between them. This isn’t really common enough to need a name that gets capitalised. It’s HTTP Response-Splitting over a shared proxy with shitty user segregation.
I don’t remotely anticipate that I’ll change the names people give to these vulnerabilities in scanning tools or in pen-test reports.
But I do hope you’ll be able to use these to stop confusion in its tracks, as I did:
“Never mind cross-whatever, let’s talk about how long it’s going to take you to address the clickjacking issue.”
Here’s the TL;DR version of the web post:
Prevent or interrupt confusion by referring to bugs using the following non-confusing terms:
|Confusing||Not Confusing Much, Probably|
|Cross-Site History Manipulation||[Not common enough to name]|
|Cross-Site Tracing||TRACE is enabled|
|Cross-Site Request Forgery||Forced User Action|
|Cross-Site Scripting||HTML Injection
|Cross-User Defacement||Crappy proxy server|
Back when I started developing code, and that was a fairly long time ago, the vast majority of developers I interacted with had taken that job because they were excited to be working with technology, and enjoyed instructing and controlling computers to an extent that was perhaps verging on the creepy.
Much of what I read about application security strongly reflects this even today, where developers are exhorted to remember that security is an aspect of the overall quality of your work as a developer.
This is great – for those developers who care about the quality of their work. The artisans, if you like.
For every artisan I meet when talking to developers, there’s about another two or three who are more like labourers.
They turn up on time, they do their daily grind, and they leave on time. Even if the time expected / demanded of them is longer than the usual eight hours a day.
By itself, this isn’t a bad thing. When you need another pair of “OK” and “Cancel” buttons, you want someone to hammer them out, not hand-craft them in bronze. When you need an API to a back-end database, you want it thin and functional, not baroque and beautiful.
It’s important to note that these guys mostly do what they are told. They are clever, and can be told to do complex things, but they are not single-mindedly interested in the software they are building, except in as much as you will reward them for delivering it.
If these developers will build only the software they’re told to build, what are you telling them to build?
At any stage, are you actively telling your developers that they have to adhere to security policies, or that they have to build in any kind of “security best practice”, or even to “think like an attacker” (much as I hate that phrase) – I’d rather you tell them to “think about all the ways every part of your code can fail, and work to prevent them” [“think like a defender”]?
Some of your developers will interject their own ideas of quality.
– But –
Most of your developers will only do as they have been instructed, and as their examples tell them.
The first thing to note is that you won’t reach these developers just with optional training, and you might not even reach them just with mandatory training. They will turn up to mandatory training, because it is required of them, and they may turn up to optional training because they get a day’s pay for it. But all the appeals to them to take on board the information you’re giving them will fall upon deaf ears, if they return to their desks and don’t get follow-up from their managers.
When your AppSec program makes training happen, your developers’ managers must make it clear to their developers that they are expected to take part, they are expected to learn something, and they are expected to come back and start using and demonstrating what they have learned.
Curiously enough, that’s also helpful for the artisans.
Second, don’t despair about these developers. They are useful and necessary, and as with all binary distinctions, the lines are not black and white, they are a spectrum of colours. There are developers at all stages between the “I turn up at 10, I work until 6 (as far as you know), and I do exactly what I’m told” end and the “I love this software as if it were my own child, and I want to mould it into a perfect shining paragon of perfection” end.
Don’t despair, but be realistic about who you have hired, and who you will hire as a result of your interview techniques.
Third, if you want more artisans and fewer labourers, the only way to do that is to change your hiring and promotion techniques.
Screen for quality-biased developers during the interview process. Ask them “what’s wrong with the code”, and reward them for saying “it’s not very easy to understand, the comments are awful, it uses too many complex constructs for the job it’s doing, etc”.
Reward quality where you find it. “We had feedback from one of the other developers on the team that you spent longer on this project than expected, but produced code that works flawlessly and is easy to maintain – you exceed expectations.”
Labourers as opposed to artisans have no internal “quality itch” to scratch, which means quality bars must be externally imposed, measured, and enforced.
What are you doing to reward developers for securing their development?
The first problem any security project has is to get executive support. The second problem is to find a way to make use of and direct that executive support.
Developers should be prepared to defend against a Manager in the Middle attack.
— Alun Jones (@ftp_alun) November 9, 2015
So, that was the original tweet that seems to have been a little popular (not fantastically popular, but then I only have a handful of followers).
I’m sure a lot of people thought it was just an amusing pun, but it’s actually a realisation on my part that there’s a real thing that needs naming here.
By and large, the companies I’ve worked for and/or with in the last few years have experienced a glacial but certain shift in perspective.
Where once the security team seemed to be perceived as a necessary nuisance to the executive layers, it seems clear now that there have been sufficient occurrences of bad news (and CEOs being forced to resign) that executives come TO the security team for reassurance that they won’t become the next … well, the next whatever the last big incident was.
Obviously, those executives still have purse strings to manage, and most security professionals like to get paid, because that’s largely what distinguishes them from security amateurs. So security can’t get ALL the dollars, but it’s generally easier to get the money and the firepower for security than it ever was in the past.
So executives support security. Some of them even ask what more they can do – and they seem sincere.
Well, some of them do, but that’s a topic for another post.
There are sufficient numbers of developers who care about quality and security these days, that there’s less of a need to be pushing the security message to developers quite how we used to.
We’ve mostly reached those developers who are already on our side.
And those developers can mentor other developers who aren’t so keen on security.
The security-motivated developers want to learn more from us, they’re aware that security is an issue, and for the most part, they’re capable of finding and even distinguishing good security solutions to use.
If the guys at the top, and the guys at the bottom (sorry devs, but the way the org structure goes, you don’t manage anyone, so ipso facto you are at the bottom, along with the cleaners, the lawyers, and the guy who makes sure the building doesn’t get stolen in the middle of the night) care about security, why are we still seeing sites get attacked successfully? Why are apps still being successfully exploited?
Why is it that I can exploit a web site with SQL injection, an attack that has been around for as long as many of the developers at your company have been aware of computers?
Someone is getting in the way.
Ask anyone in your organisation if they think security is important, and you’ll get varying answers, most of which are acknowledging that without security in the software being developed, so it’s clear that you can’t actually poll people that way for the right answer.
Often it’s the security team – because it’s really hard to fill out a security team, and to stretch out around the organisation.
But that’s not the whole answer.
Ask the security-conscious developers what’s preventing them from becoming a security expert to their team, and they’ll make it clear – they’re rewarded and/or punished at their annual review times by the code they produce that delivers features.
And because managers are driving behaviour through performance reviews, it actually doesn’t matter what the manager tells their underlings, even if they give their devs a weekly spiel about how important security is. Even if you have an executive show up at their meetings and tell them security is “Job #1”. Even if he means it.
Those developers will return to their desks, and they’ll look at the goals against which they’ll be reviewed come performance review time.
If managers don’t specifically reward good security behaviour, most developers will not produce secure code.
This is the Manager in the Middle Attack. Note that it applies in the event that no manager is present (thanks, Dan Kaminsky!)
— Dan Kaminsky(@dakami) November 10, 2015
Because I never like to point out a problem without proposing a solution:
Managers have to actively manage their developers into changing their behaviours. Some performance goals will help, along with the support (financial and moral) to make them achievable.
Here are a few sample goals:
That’s quite a bunch of security-related goals for developers, which managers can implement. All of them can be measured, and I’m not so crass as to suggest that I know which numbers will be appropriate to your appetite for risk, or the size of hole out of which you have to dig yourself.
Every year, in October, we celebrate National Cyber Security Awareness Month.
Normally, I’m dismissive of anything with the word “Cyber” in it. This is no exception – the adjective “cyber” is a manufactured word, without root, without meaning, and with only a tenuous association to the world it endeavours to describe.
But that’s not the point.
And I do it from a very basic level.
This is not the place for me to assume you’ve all been reading and understanding security for years – this is where I appeal to readers with only a vague understanding that there’s a “security” thing out there that needs addressing.
This first week is all about Information Security – Cyber Security, as the government and military put it – as our shared responsibility.
I’m a security professional, in a security team, and my first responsibility is to remind the thousands of other employees that I can’t secure the company, our customers, our managers, and our continued joint success, without everyone pitching in just a little bit.
I’m also a customer, with private data of my own, and I have a responsibility to take reasonable measures to protect that data, and by extension, my identity and its association with me. But I also need others to take up their responsibility in protecting me.
This year, I’ve had my various identifying factors – name, address, phone number, Social Security Number (if you’re not from the US, that’s a government identity number that’s rather inappropriately used as proof of identity in too many parts of life) – misappropriated by others, and used in an attempt to buy a car, and to file taxes in my name. So, I’ve filed reports of identity theft with a number of agencies and organisations.
Just today, another breach report arrives, from a company I do business with, letting me know that more data has been lost – this time from one of the organisations charged with actually protecting my identity and protecting my credit.
While companies can – and should – do much more to protect customers (and putative customers), and their data, it’s also incumbent on the customers to protect themselves.
Every day, thousands of new credit and debit cards get issued to eager recipients, many of them teenagers and young adults.
Excited as they are, many of these youths share pictures of their new cards on Twitter or Facebook. Occasionally with both sides. There’s really not much your bank can do if you’re going to react in such a thoughtless way, with a casual disregard for the safety of your data.
Sure, you’re only liable for the first $50 of any use of your credit card, and perhaps of your debit card, but it’s actually much better to not have to trace down unwanted charges and dispute them in the first place.
So, I’m going to buy into the first message of National Cyber Security Awareness Month – and I’m going to suggest you do the same:
This is really the base part of all security – before doing a thing, stop a moment. Think about whether it’s a good thing to do, or has negative consequences you hadn’t considered. Connect with other people to find out what they think.
I’ll finish tonight with some examples where stopping a moment to think, and connecting with others to pool knowledge, will improve your safety and security online. More tomorrow.
The most common password is “12345678”, or “password”. This means that many people are using that simple a password. Many more people are using more secure passwords, but they still make mistakes that could be prevented with a little thought.
Passwords leak – either from their owners, or from the systems that use those passwords to recognise the owners.
When they do, those passwords – and data associated with them – can then be used to log on to other sites those same owners have visited. Either because their passwords are the same, or because they are easily predicted. If my password at Adobe is “This is my Adobe password”, well, that’s strong(ish), but it also gives a hint as to what my Amazon password is – and when you crack the Adobe password leak (that’s already available), you might be able to log on to my Amazon account.
Creating unique passwords – and yes, writing them down (or better still, storing them in a password manager), and keeping them safe – allows you to ensure that leaks of your passwords don’t spread to your other accounts.
There are exciting events which happen to us every day, and which we want to share with others.
That’s great, and it’s what Twitter and Facebook are there FOR. All kinds of social media available for you to share information with your friends.
Unfortunately, it’s also where a whole lot of bad people hang out – and some of those bad people are, unfortunately, your friends and family.
Be careful what you share, and if you’re sharing about others, get their permission too.
If you’re sharing about children, contemplate that there are predators out there looking for the information you may be giving out. There’s one living just up the road, I can assure you. They’re almost certainly safely withdrawn, and you’re protected from them by natural barriers and instincts. But you have none of those instincts on Facebook unless you stop, think and connect.
So don’t post addresses, locations, your child’s phone number, and really limit things like names of children, friends, pets, teachers, etc – imagine that someone will use that as ‘proof’ to your child of their safety. “It’s OK, I was sent by Aunt Josie, who’s waiting for you to come and see Dobbie the cat”
Bob’s going off on vacation for a month.
Just in case, while he’s gone, he’s left you his password, so that you can log on and access various files.
Two months later, and the office gets raided by the police. They’ve traced a child porn network to your company. To Bob.
Well, actually, to Bob and to you, because the system can’t tell the difference between Bob and you.
Don’t share accounts. Make Bob learn (with the IT department’s help) how to share portions of his networked files appropriately. It’s really not all that hard.
I develop software. The first thing I write is always a basic proof of concept.
The second thing I write – well, who’s got time for a second thing?
Make notes in comments every time you skip a security decision, and make those notes in such a way that you can revisit them and address them – or at least, count them – prior to release, so that you know how badly you’re in the mess.
The recent hack of Ashley Madison, and the subsequent discussion, reminded me of something I’ve been meaning to talk about for some time.
This is usually expressed, as my title suggests, by a user asking the web site who hosted that user’s account (and usually directly as a result of a data breach) why that web site still had the user’s data.
This can be because the user deliberately deleted their account, or simply because they haven’t used the service in a long time, and only remembered that they did by virtue of a breach notification letter (or a web site such as Troy Hunt’s haveibeenpwned.com).
Web sites do not see it as a good idea to have a ‘delete’ feature for their user accounts – after all, what you’re asking is for a site to devote developer resources to a feature that specifically curtails the ability of that web site to continue to make money from the user.
To an accountant’s eye (or a shareholder’s), that’s money out the door with the prospect of reducing money coming in.
To a user’s eye, it’s a matter of security and trust. If the developer deliberately misses a known part of the user’s lifecycle (sunset and deprecation are both terms developers should be familiar with), it’s fairly clear that there are other things likely to be missing or skimped on. If a site allows users to disconnect themselves, to close their accounts, there’s a paradox that says more users will choose to continue their service, because they don’t feel trapped.
So, let’s assume there is a “delete” or “close my account” feature – and that it’s easy to use and functional.
In the aftermath of the Ashley Madison hack, I’m sure there’s going to be a few partners who are going to engage in retributive behaviours. Those behaviours could include connecting to any accounts that the partners have shared, and cause them to be closed, deleted and destroyed as much as possible. It’s the digital equivalent of cutting the sleeves off the cheating partner’s suit jackets. Probably.
Assuming you’ve finally settled down and broken/made up, you’ll want those accounts back under your control.
So there might need to be a feature to allow for ‘remorse’ over the deletion of an account. Maybe not for the jealous partner reason, even, but perhaps just because you forgot about a service you were making use of by that account, and which you want to resurrect.
OK, so many sites have a ‘resurrect’ function, or a ‘cool-down’ period before actually terminating an account.
Facebook, for instance, will not delete your account until you’ve been inactive for 30 days.
Let’s say you’re a terrorist. Or a violent criminal, or a drug baron, or simply someone who needs to be sued for slanderous / libelous statements made online.
OK, in this case, you don’t WANT the server to keep your history – but to satisfy warrants of this sort, a lawyer is likely to tell the server’s operators that they have to keep history for a specific period of time before discarding them. This allows for court orders and the like to be executed against the server to enforce the rule of law.
So your server probably has to hold onto that data for more than the 30 day inactive period. Local laws are going to put some kind of statute on how long a service provider has to hold onto your data.
As an example, a retention notice served under the UK’s rather steep RIPA law could say the service provider has to hold on to some types of data for as much as 12 months after the data is created.
If you’ve paid for the service being provided, those transaction details have to be held for possible accounting audits for the next several years (in the US, between 3 and 7 years, depending on the nature of the business, last time I checked).
Obviously, you’re not going to expect an audit to go into complete investigations of all your individual service requests – unless you’re billed to that level. Still, this record is going to consist of personal details of every user in the system, amounts paid, service levels given, a la carte services charged for, and some kind of demonstration that service was indeed provided.
So, even if Ashley Madison, or whoever, provided a “full delete” service, there’s a record that they have to keep somewhere that says you paid them for a service at some time in the past.
I don’t think eternal data retention is appropriate or desirable. It’s important for developers to know data retention periods ahead of time, and to build them into the tools and services they provide.
Hackers fetch data from online services. Offline services – truly offline services – are fundamentally impossible to steal over the network. An attacker would have to find the facility where they’re stored, or the truck the tapes/drives are traveling in, and steal the data physically.
Not that that’s impossible, but it’s a different proposition from guessing someone’s password and logging into their servers to steal data.
Once data is no longer required for online use, and can be stored, move it into a queue for offline archiving. Developers should make sure their archivist has a data destruction policy in place as well, to get rid of data that’s just too old to be of use. Occasionally (once a year, perhaps), they should practice a data recovery, just to make sure that they can do so when the auditors turn up. But they should also make sure that they have safeguards in place to prevent/limit illicit viewing / use of personal data while checking these backups.
Different classifications of data have different retention periods, something I alluded to above. Financial records are at the top end with seven years or so, and the minutiae of day-to-day conversations can probably be deleted remarkably quickly. Some services actually hype that as a value of the service itself, promising the messages will vanish in a snap, or like a ghost.
When developing a service, you should consider how you’re going to classify data so that you know what to keep and what to delete, and under what circumstances. You may need a lawyer to help with that.
If you lay the frameworks in place when developing a service, so that data is classified and has a documented lifecycle, your service naturally becomes more loosely coupled. This makes it smoother to implement, easier to change, and more compartmentalised. This helps speed future development.
Users who know they can quit are more likely to remain loyal (Apple aside). If a user feels hemmed in and locked in place, all that’s required is for someone to offer them a reason to change, and they’ll do so. Often your own staff will provide the reason to change, because if you’re working hard to keep customers by locking them in, it demonstrates that you don’t feel like your customers like your service enough to stay on their own.
Yeah, I know, “to whom you give data”, thanks, grammar pedants.
Remember some basic rules here:
Yeah, and Richard Stallmann’s windows want to be broken.
Data doesn’t want anything, but the appearance is that it does, because when data is disseminated, it essentially cannot be returned. Just like if you go to RMS’s house and break all his windows, you can’t then put the glass fragments back into the frames.
Developers want to possess and collect data – it’s an innate passion, it seems. So if you give data to a developer (or the developer’s proxy, any application they’ve developed), you can’t actually get it back – in the sense that you can’t tell if the developer no longer has it.
Occasionally developers will collect and keep data that they know they shouldn’t. Sometimes they’ll go and see which famous celebrities used their service recently, or their ex-partners, or their ‘friends’ and acquaintances.
EU data protection laws start from the basic assumption that factual data describing a person is essentially the non-transferrable property of the person it describes. It can be held for that person by a data custodian, a business with whom the person has a business relationship, or which has a legal right or requirement to that data. But because the data belongs to the person, that person can ask what data is held about them, and can insist on corrections to factual mistakes.
The US, and many other countries, start from the premise that whoever has collected data about a person actually owns that data, or at least that copy of the data. As a result, there’s less emphasis on openness about what data is held about you, and less access to information about yourself.
Ideally, when the revolution comes and we have a socialist government (or something in that direction), the US will pick up this idea and make it clear that service providers are providing a service and acting only as a custodian of data about their customers.
Until then, remember that US citizens have no right to discover who’s holding their data, how wrong it might be, or to ask for it to be corrected.
Developers should also think about this – you can’t leak data you don’t hold. Similarly, if a user doesn’t give data, or gives incorrect or value-less data, if it leaks, that data is fundamentally worthless.
The fallout from the Ashley Madison leak is probably reduced significantly by the number of pseudonyms and fake names in use. Probably.
Hey, if you used your real name on a cheating web site, that’s hardly smart. But then, as I said earlier today, sometimes security is about protecting bad people from bad things happening to them.
You might use the same nickname at several places; you might provide information that’s similar to your real information; you might link multiple pseudonymous accounts together. If your data leaks, can you afford to ‘burn’ the identity attached to the pseudonym?
If you have a long message history, you have almost certainly identified yourself pretty firmly in your pseudonymous posts, by spelling patterns, word usages, etc.
Leaks of pseudonymous data are less problematic than leaks of eponymous data, but they still have their problems. Unless you’re really good at OpSec.
Finally, I was disappointed earlier tonight to see that Troy had already covered some aspects of this topic in his weekly series at Windows IT Pro, but I think you’ll see that his thoughts are from a different direction than mine.
Not much has been released about exactly how Premera got attacked, and certainly nothing from anyone with recognised insider knowledge.
Disclaimer: I worked at Premera in the Information Security team, but it’s so so long ago that any of my internal knowledge is incorrect – so I’ll only talk about those things that I have seen published.
I am, above all, a customer of Premera’s, from 2004 until just a few weeks ago. But I’m a customer with a strong background in Information Security.
Almost everything boils down rather simply to one article as the source of what we know.
February 4, 2015: News stories break about Anthem’s breach (formerly Wellpoint).
January 29, 2015: The date given by Premera as the date when they were first made aware that they’d been attacked.
I don’t think that it’s a coincidence that these dates are so close together. In my opinion, these dates imply that Anthem / Wellpoint found their own issues, notified the network of other health insurance companies, and then published to the news outlets.
As a result of this, Premera recognised the same attack patterns in their own systems.
This suggests that any other health insurance companies attacked by the same group (alleged to be “Deep Panda”) will discover and disclose it shortly.
I’ve kind of driven in the idea that Anthem used to be called Wellpoint, and the reason I’m bringing this out is that a part of the attack documented by ThreatConnect was to create a site called “we11point.com” – that’s “wellpoint.com”, but with the two letter “els” replaced with two “one” digits.
That’s relevant because the ThreatConnect article also called out that there was a web site called “prennera.com” created by the same group.
So, given a domain name similar to that of a site you wish to attack, how would you get full access to the company behind that site?
Here’s just one way you might mount that attack. There are other ways to do this, but this is the most obvious, given the limited information above.
If you’re concerned that I’m telling attackers how to do this, remember that this is obvious stuff. This is already a well known attack strategy, “homograph attacks”. This is what a penetration tester will do if you hire one to test your susceptibility to social engineering.
There’s no vulnerability involved, there’s no particularly obvious technical failing here, it’s just the age-old tactic of giving someone a screen that looks like their logon page, and telling them they’ve failed to logon. I saw this basic form of attack in the eighties, it’s that old.
If you’ve been reading my posts to date, you’ll know that I’m aware that security offence is sexy and exciting, but security defence is really where the clever stuff belongs.
I have a few simple recommendations that I think apply in this case:
Another tack that’s taken by companies is to engage a reputation management company, to register domain names that are homoglyphs to your own (those that look the same in a browser address bar). Or, to file lawsuits that take down such domains when they appear. Whichever is cheaper. My perspective on this is that it costs money, and is doomed to fail whenever a new TLD arises, or your company creates a new brand.
[Not that reputation management companies can’t help you with your domain names, mind you – they can prevent you, for instance, from releasing a product with a name that’s already associated with a domain name owned by another company.]
These three steps are somewhat interdependent, and they may cause a certain degree of inconvenience, but they will prevent exactly the kind of attacks I’ve described. [Yes, there are other potential attacks, but none introduced by the suggested changes]
Last weekend, along with countless employees and ex-employees of Microsoft, Amazon, Expedia, and Premera itself, I received a breach notification signed by Premera’s President & CEO, Jeffrey Roe.
Here’s a few things I think can already be learned from this letter and the available public information:
Whenever I see the phrase “sophisticated cyberattack”, not only am I turned off by the meaningless prefix “cyber”, which seems to serve only to “baffle them with bullshit”, but I’m also convinced that the author is trying to convince me that, hey, this attack was just too amazing and science-fictiony to do anything to stop.
All that does is push me in the other direction – to assume that the attack was relatively simple, and should have been prevented and/or noticed.
Granted, my experience is in Information Security, and so I’m always fairly convinced that it’ll be the simple attacks, not the complex and difficult ones, that will be the most successful against any site I’m trying to protect. It’s a little pessimistic, but it’s been proven right time and again.
So, never say that an attack is “sophisticated” unless you really mean that the attack was way beyond what could have been reasonably imagined. You don’t have to say the attackers used simple methods to get in because your team are idiots, because that’s unlikely to be entirely true, either. Just don’t make it sound like it’s not your fault. And don’t make that your opening gambit, either – this was the very first sentence in Premera’s notification.
“some of your personal information may have been accessed”
Again, this phrasing simply makes me think “these guys have no idea what was accessed”, which really doesn’t inspire confidence.
Instead, you should say “the attackers had access to all our information, including your personal and medical data”. Then acknowledge that you don’t have tracking on what information was exported, so you have to act as if it all was.
The worst apologies on record all contain some variation of “I’m sorry you’re upset”, or “I’m sorry you took offence”.
Premera’s version of this is “We … regret the concern it may cause”. So, not even “sorry”. And to the extent that it’s an apology at all, it is that we, current and past customers, were “concerned”.
Premera Blue Cross (“Premera”) …
… Information Technology (IT) systems
As if the lack of apology didn’t already tip us off that this document was prepared by a lawyer, the parenthetical creation of abbreviations to be used later on makes it completely clear.
If the letter had sounded more human, it would have been easier to receive as something other than a legal arse-covering exercise.
The letter acknowledges that the issue was discovered on January 29, 2015, and the letter is dated March 17, 2015. That’s nearly two months. And nearly a year since the attackers got in. That’s assuming that you’ve truly figured out the extent of the “sophisticated cyberattack”.
Actually, that’s pretty fast for security breach disclosure, but it still gives the impression to customers that you aren’t letting them know in enough time to protect themselves.
The reason given for this delay is that Premera wanted to ensure that their systems were safe before letting other attackers know about the issue – but it’s generally a fallacy to assume that attackers don’t know about your vulnerabilities. Premera, and the health insurance industry, do a great job of sharing security information with other health insurance providers – but the attackers do an even better job of sharing information about vulnerable systems and tools.
Which leads us to…
If your company doesn’t have a prepared breach disclosure letter, approved by public relations, the security team and your lawyers, it’s going to take you at least a week, probably two, to put one together. And you’ll have missed something, because you’re preparing it in a rush, in a panic, and in a haze while you’re angry and scared about having been attacked.
Your prepared letter won’t be complete, and won’t be entirely applicable to whatever breach finally comes along and bites you, but it’ll put you that much closer to being ready to handle and communicate that breach. You’ll still need to review it and argue between Security, Legal and PR teams.
Have a plan for this review process, and know the triggers that will start it. Maybe even test the process once in a while.
If you believe that breaches could require a credit notification or ID tracking protection, negotiate this ahead of time, so that this will not slow you down in your announcement. Or write your notification letter with the intent of providing this information at a later time.
Finally, because your notification letter will miss something, make sure it includes the ability to update your customers – link to an FAQ online that can be updated, and provide a call-in number for people to ask questions of an informed team of responders.
There’s always more information coming out about this vulnerability, and I plan to blog a little more about it later.
Let me know in particular if there’s something you’d like me to cover on this topic.
It’s about this time of year that I think…
Ah, who am I kidding, I think those kinds of things all the time.
Reading a story on the consequences of the theft of Adobe’s source code by hackers, I come across this startling phrase:
The hackers seem to be targeting vulnerabilities they find within the stolen code. The prediction is that they’re sifting through the code, attempting to find widespread weaknesses, intending to exploit them with maximum effect by using zero-day attacks.
What I’d love to know is why we aren’t seeing a flood of developers crying out to be educated in how they, too, can learn to sift through their own code, attempt to find widespread weaknesses, so they can shore them up and prevent their code from being exploited.
An example of the sort of comments we are seeing can be found here, and they are fairly predictable – “does this mean Open Source is flawed, if having access to the source code is a security risk”, schadenfreude at Adobe’s misfortune, all manner of assertions that Adobe weren’t a very secure company anyway, etc.
So, if you’re in the business of developing software – whether to sell, licence, give away, or simply to use in your own endeavours, you’re essentially in the same boat as Adobe prior to the hackers breaching their defences. Possibly the same boat as Adobe after the breach, but prior to the discovery.
Unless you are doing something different to what Adobe did, you are setting yourself up to be the next Adobe.
Obviously, Adobe isn’t giving us entire details of their own security program, and what’s gone right or wrong with it, but previous stories (as early as mid-2009) indicated that they were working closely with Microsoft to create an SDL (Security Development Lifecycle) for Adobe’s development.
So, instead of being all kinds of smug that Adobe got hacked, and you didn’t, maybe you should spend your time wondering if you can improve your processes to even reach the level Adobe was at when they got hacked.
And, to bring the topic back to what started the discussion – are you even doing to your software what these unidentified attackers are doing to Adobe’s code?
How long are you spending to do that, and what tools are you using to do so?