Active Directory Trusts

Published 11/2016
Recompiled 3/2018

Intro

AD Trusts have always been confusing to many, such as, which direction does the trust point? I’ve included an easy to understand analogy that uses you and a friend as an example. I hope this helps. Ping me if you have any questions.

Scope

Let’s discuss AD trusts. And further in, after we discuss trusts types, we’ll revisit Kerberos authentication across a trust path, which I’ve previously discussed in the following blog and is pertinent in the scope of explaining trusts:

Kerberos Authentication Sequence Across Trusts
Kerberos Authentication Sequence Across Trusts

Active Directory Trusts

Active Directory domain to domain communications occur through a trust. An AD DS trust is a secured, authentication communication channel between entities, such as AD DS domains, forests, and UNIX realms. Trusts enable you to grant access to resources to users, groups and computers across entities.

The way a trust works is similar to allowing a trusted entity to access your own resources. It’s a two-step process. The first step is to establish the trust. The second step is to provide permissions.

For example, if users in the Contoso.com domain require access to a shared folder in the Trimagna.com domain, and the two domains are not in the same forest, you would establish the trust where Trimagna.com trusts Contoso.com, therefore the direction of the arrow would be Trimagna.com points to Contoso.com.

For an analogy, if you were to give your car keys to a friend to allow him or her to use your car, you are establishing a trust between you and your friend. In this case, you are the trusting friend, or domain, and the friend is the trusted friend, or domain. Once the keys have been provided, then the next step is to allow access to your resource, or car, by providing permissions to use the car. However, this trust is only in one direction, you trust your friend. If you want your friend to trust you, your friend, or the other domain, must be initiated by your friend, or the other domain.

AD DS Trust Types

There are various trust types. The trust that you create must be appropriate for the design. Trusts can be transitive or non-transitive. The one that you choose to create depends on the scenario and requirements. Other trusts types can be created as required, depending on the scenario. The table below shows the various trust types you can create.

Trusts can be created using the New Trust Wizard found in the Active Directory Domains and Trusts console, or using the Netdom command line utility. If you choose to create one of the one-way trust types in both directions, it can be created simultaneously, or separately. If you create it separately, you must re-run the procedure to establish the trust in the other direction.

Trust Type	Characteristics	Direction	Authentication Mechanism	Notes
Parent-Child	Transitive	Two-way	Kerberos V5 or NTLM	Created automatically when a child domain is added.
Tree-Root	Transitive	Two-way	Kerberos V5 or NTLM	Created automatically when a new Tree is added to a forest.
Shortcut	Transitive	One-way or Two-way	Kerberos V5 or NTLM	Created Manually. Used in an AD DS forest to shorten the trust path to improve authentication times.
Forest	Transitive	One-way or Two-way	Kerberos V5 or NTLM	Created Manually. Used to share resources between AD DS forests.
External	Non-transitive	One-way	NTLM Only	Created Manually. Used to access resources in an NT 4.0 domain or a domain in another forest that does not have a forest trust established.
Realm	Transitive or non-transitive	One-way or Two-way	Kerberos V5 Only	Created Manually. Used to access resources between a non-Windows Kerberos V5 realm and an AD DS domain.

Trust Flow: Transitive vs. Non-Transitive

Trust communication flow is determined by the direction of the trust. The trust can be a one-way or a two-way trust. And the transitivity determines whether a trust can be extended beyond the two domains with which it was formed. A transitive trust can be used to extend trust relationships with other domains; a non-transitive trust can be used to deny trust relationships with other domains. Authentication requests follow a trust path. The transitivity of the trust will affect the trust path.

Transitive Trust

· Contoso.com trusts Trimagna.com.

· Contoso.com trusts Adatum.com.

· Therefore, Trimagna.com trusts Adatum.com.

One-way Trust

· Domain A trusts Domain B, but Domain B does not trust Domain A.

· Domain A trusts Domain C, but Domain C does not trust Domain A.

· Therefore, Domain B does not trust Domain C.

o For these two domains to trust each other, you would need a one way trust created between each other.

Automatic Trusts: and Tree-Root Trusts

By default, two-way, transitive trusts are created automatically when a child domain is added or when a domain tree is added. The two default trust types are parent-child trusts and tree-root trusts.

Parent-Child Trust

A transitive, two-way parent-child trust relationship automatically created and establishes a relationship between a parent domain and a child domain whenever a new child domain is created using the AD DS installation process process within a domain tree. They can only exist between two domains in the same tree with the same contiguous namespace. The parent domain is always trusted by the child domain. You cannot manually create a Parent-Child trust.

Tree-Root Trust

A transitive, two-way tree-root trust relationship automatically created and establishes a relationship between the forest root domain and a new tree, when you run the AD DS installation process to add a new tree to the forest. A tree-root trust can only be established between the roots of two trees in the same forest and are always transitive. You cannot manually create a tree-root trust.

Shortcut Trust

Shortcut trusts are manually created, one-way, transitive trusts. They can only exist within a forest. They are created to optimize the authentication process shortening the trust path. The trust path is the series of domain trust relationships that the authentication process must traverse between two domains in a forest that are not directly trusted by each other. Shortcut trusts shorten the trust path.

Forest Trust

Forest trusts are manually created, one-way transitive, or two-way transitive trusts that allow you to provide access to resources between multiple forests. Forest trusts uses both Kerberos v5 and NTLM authentication across forests where users can use their Universal Principal Name (UPN) or their Pre-Windows 2000 method (domainName\username). Kerberos v5 is attempted first, and if that fails, it will then try NTLM.

Forest trusts require DNS resolution to be established between forests, however to support NTLM failback, you must also provide NetBIOS name resolution support between the forests.

Forest trusts also provide SID filtering enforcement in Windows Server 2003 and newer. This ensures that any misuse of the SID history attribute on security principals (including the inetOrgPerson attribute) in the trusted forest cannot pose a threat to the integrity of the trusting forest.

Forest trusts cannot be extended to other forests, such as if Forest 1 trusts Forest 2, and another forest trust is created between Forest 2 and Forest 3, Forest 1 does not have an implied trust. If a trust is required, one must be manually created.

External Trust

An external trust is a one-way, non-transitive trust that is manually created to establish a trust relationship between AD DS domains that are in different forests, or between an AD DS domain and Windows NT 4.0 domain. External trusts allow you to provide users access to resources in a domain outside of the forest that is not already trusted by a Forest trust.

SID filter quarantining is enabled by default with Windows Server 2003 and newer AD DS domains. SID filtering verifies that incoming authentication requests made from security principals in the trusted domain contain only SIDs of security principals from the trusted domain.

External trusts are NTLM based, meaning users must authenticate using the Pre-Windows 2000 logon method (domain\username).NTLM requires NetBIOS name resolution support for functionality.

Additional reading on creating External Trusts and DNS Support:

DNS and NetBIOS Name Resolution to Create External, Realm and Forest Trusts
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee307976(v=ws.10).aspx
Configure a DNS Server to Use Forwarders
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754941.aspx

Realm Trust

A Realm trust can be established to provide resource access and cross-platform inter-operability between an AD DS domain and non-Windows Kerberos v5 Realm.

A Realm trust only uses Kerberos V5 authentication. NTLM is not used.
When the direction of the trust is from a non-Windows Kerberos Realm to an AD DS domain (Realm trusts AD DS domain), the non-Windows realm trusts all security principals in the AD DS domain.
Realm trusts are one-way by default, but you can create a trust in the other direction to allow two-way access.
Because non-Windows Kerberos tickets do not contain all the information AD DS requires, the AD DS domain only uses the account to which the proxy account (the non-Windows principal) is mapped to evaluate access requests and authorization. With Realm trusts, all AD DS domain proxy accounts can be used in an AD DS group in ACLs to control access for non-Windows accounts.

Additional reading:

Understanding Trust Types
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc730798.aspx

Trusted Domain Object (TDO)

To understand cross domain authentication, we must first understand Trusted Domain Objects (TDOs). Each domain within a forest is represented by a TDO that is stored in the System container within its domain. The information in the TDO varies depending on whether the TDO was created by a domain trust or by a forest trust.

When a domain trust is created, attributes such as the DNS domain name, domain SID, trust type, trust transitivity, and the reciprocal domain name are represented in the TDO.

When a forest trust is first established, each forest collects all of the trusted namespaces in its partner forest and then stores the information in a TDO. The trusted namespaces and attributes that are stored in the TDO include domain tree names, child domain names, user principal name (UPN) suffixes, service principal name (SPN) suffixes, and security ID (SID) namespaces used in the other forest. TDO objects are stored in each domain, then replicated to the global catalog.

Therefore, because trusts are stored in Active Directory in the global catalog as TDOs, all domains in a forest have knowledge of the trust relationships that are in place throughout the forest. If there are two or more forests that are joined together through forest trusts, the forest root domains in each forest know of the trust relationships throughout all of the domains in the trusted forests.

The only exception to the rule is External trusts to a Windows NT 4.0 domain do not create TDOs in Active Directory because it is NTLM based, in which SPN and domain SIDs do not exist, therefore do not apply.

Additional reading:

How Domain and Forest Trusts Work (TDO further explained)
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc773178(v=ws.10).aspx
Trusts (TDOs)
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc786873(v=ws.10).aspx

Trust Path between Domains

The trust path is the series of domain trust relationships that the authentication process must traverse between two domains in a forest that are not directly trusted by each other.

Before authentication for a user, computer or service can occur across trusts, Windows must determine if the domain being requested has a trust relationship with the requesting account’s logon domain. This is determined by quering the global catalog for TDO data. The Windows security system’s Netlgon service through an authenticated RPC (Remote Procedure Call) to the remote domain’s trusted domain authority, (the remote domain controller), computes a trust path between the domain controller for the server that receives the request and a domain controller in the domain of the requesting account.

The Windows security system extends a secured channel to other Active Directory domains through interdomain trust relationships. This secured channel is used to obtain and verify security information, including security identifiers (SIDs) for users and groups. The trust path is stored for authentication requests to the trusted domain.

Kerberos authentication Sequence between Domains in a Forest

A user in the marketing.trimagna.com domains needs to gain access to a file share on a server called fileserver.sales.contoso.com domain. This is assuming the User has already logged on to a workstation using credentials from the marketing.trimagna.com domain. As part of the logon process, the authenticating domain controller issues the User a ticket-granting ticket (TGT). This ticket is required for User1 to be authenticated to resources.

The User attempts to access a shared resource on \\FileServer.sales.contoso.com\share.

The following Kerberos V5 authentication process occurs:

1. The User’s workstation asks for a session ticket for the FileServer server in sales.contoso.com by contacting the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) on a domain controller in its domain (ChildDC1) and requests a service ticket for the FileServer.sales.contoso.com service principal name (SPN).

2. The KDC in the user’s domain (marketing.trimagna.com) does not find the SPN for FileServer.sales.contoso.com in its domain database and queries the GC to see if any domains in the forest contain this SPN.

a. The GC checks its database about all forest trusts that exist in its forest. If a trust to the target domain is found, it compares the name suffixes listed in the forest trust trusted domain objects (TDOs) to the suffix of the target SPN to find a match.

b. Once a match is found, the global catalog sends the requested information as a referral back to the KDC in marketing.trimagna.com.

3. The KDC in the marketing.trimagna.com then issues the workstation a TGT for the contoso.com domain. This is known as a referral ticket.

4. The workstation then contacts the KDC in the trimagna.com tree root domain to request a referral to the KDC in the sales.contoso.com.

5. The KDC in the trimagna.com domain recognizes the user’s request to establish a session with a resource that exists in a foreign domain’s server.

a. The KDC then issues a TGT for the KDC in the contoso.com domain.

6. The workstation then presents the TGT for the sales.contoso.com domain to the KDC in the contoso.com domain.

7. The contoso.com KDC queries a GC to see if any domains in the forest contain this SPN. The GC checks its database about all forest trusts that exist in its forest. If a trust to the target domain is found, it compares the name suffixes listed in the forest trust trusted domain objects (TDOs) to the suffix of the target SPN to find a match.

a. Once a match is found, the global catalog sends the requested information as a referral back to the KDC in contoso.com.

8. The KDC issues a TGT for the sales.contoso.com domain.

9. The workstation then contacts the KDC of the sales.contoso.com domain and presents the referral ticket it received from its own KDC.

a. The referral ticket is encrypted with the interdomain key that is decrypted by the foreign domain’s TGS.

b. Note: When there is a trust established between two domains, an interdomain key based on the trust password becomes available for authenticating KDC functions, therefore it’s used to encrypt and decrypt tickets.

10. The workstation also presents the KDC in the sales.contoso.com the TGT it received from the KDC in contoso.com for the sales.contoso.com domain and is issued a ST (Session Ticket) for the sales.contoso.com domain.

a. The ST is populated with the domain local group memberships from the sales.contoso.com domain.

11. The user presents FileServer.sales.contoso.com the ST to the server to gain access to resources on the server in sales.contoso.com.

12. The server, FileServer.sales.contoso.com compares the SIDs include in the session ticket to the ACEs on the requested resource to determine if the user is authorized to access the resource. If there is, the user is permitted to access the resource based on the ACL permissions.

Kerberos Authentication with a Shortcut Trust

If a shortcut trust exists from the sales.contoso.com domain to the marketing.trimagna.com domain, then the trust path will shortened, therefore the user authentication path will be direct between the two domains.

Additional Reading

Kerberos Explained
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb742516.aspx
Accessing resources across domains [and trusts]
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787646(v=ws.10).aspx

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Ace Fekay
MVP, MCT, MCSE 2012, MCITP EA & MCTS Windows 2008/R2, Exchange 2013, 2010 EA & 2007, MCSE & MCSA 2003/2000, MCSA Messaging 2003
Microsoft Certified Trainer
Microsoft MVP – Directory Services

Complete List of Technical Blogs: http://www.delawarecountycomputerconsulting.com/technicalblogs.php

This posting is provided AS-IS with no warranties or guarantees and confers no rights.

October 15, 2016October 15, 2016

Active Directory DNS Single Label Names

Intro

Hey everyone, Ace again. Let’s discuss this issue. I hardly see this issue any more, because it was a previously prevalent when Active Directory was introduced, since there were some confusion about AD domain naming, and many IT admins used NT4’s domain naming guidelines. Man of us are now familiar with AD’s naming convention, and have more than likely renamed or rebuilt their AD domains. However, there are still some installations with this issue.

How did it happen? Many reasons, such as lack of research on AD’s DNS requirements, assumptions, or a simple typo when originally upgrading from NT4 or promoting your new AD domain. It doesn’t matter now, because you were brought here to find out what to do with it.

I hope you find this blog informative on this issue and what to do about it.

First, let’s discuss a little background on the necessary components at play…

FQDN

First, let’s discuss the FQDN. What is an FQDN? It stands for “Fully Qualified Domain Name.” It is multi-level, or hierarchal, such as:

domain.com
domain.net
domain.local
childdomainname.domain.local
etc

What is a Single Label DNS Domain name?
The name is reminiscent of the legacy style NT4 domain NetBIOS domain names, such as:

DOMAIN
CORP
COMPANYNAME
etc

Unfortunately, since this does not work with DNS, and Active Directory relies on DNS, therefore, it does not work with Active Directory. Stay with me. I’ll explain…

DNS

DNS is a hierarchal database. Some call it a “tree” with a root (the ‘com’ or ‘net’, etc, name), then the trunk (the ‘domain’ portion of it), and the branches (such as www, servername, etc). The Root domain name, such as com, edu, net, etc, is also known as the TLD (Tope Level Domain name).

Basically you can look at a DNS domain name as having multiple levels separated by periods. The minimal requirment for an FQDN domain name, such as microsoft.com, is two levels. Then of course are your resource names, such as www, servername, or even child domain names under it.

Notice with a single label name there is only one name for the domain, or one level? Don’t get this confused with the NetBIOS domain name, that we were familiar with in the NT4 days. AD supports the NetBIOS domain name as well, but only as a NetBIOS domain name. It’s one of the domain names chosen when a machine is promoted into a domain controller for a brand new domain in a brand new forest. NT4 wasn’t reliant nor did it use DNS for NT4 domains. However, AD is reliant, therefore it must follow DNS naming rules.

Unfortunately the old NT4 style names are not hierarchal because there is only one level.

Since AD requires and relies on DNS, and DNS is a hierarchal database, a single label name does not follow any sort of hierarchy. DNS fails with single label names. Windows 2008, Windows 2003, XP and Vista have problems resolving single label names because it does not follow the proper format for a DNS domain name, such as domain.com, etc.

Also, Windows 2000 SP4 and all newer machines have problems querying single label names. It’s explained below by Alan Woods. Because clients query DNS for AD resources (domain controller locations and other services), they may have difficulty finding resources.

How did it happen? As I said earlier, it doesn’t matter now, because you were brought here to find out what to do with it.

Common Mistakes When Upgrading a Windows 2000 Domain To a Windows 2003 Domain (or any AD upgrade or installation):
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/555040

Single Label Name Explanation

Another variation of the Single Label Name explanation that I had provided in a response to a post in the DNS and/or AD newsgroups at one time:

The issue is the single label name. Locally at HQ, it’s using NetBIOS to join, however remotely, it’s relying on DNS. DNS queries do not work properly with single label names on Windows 2000 SP4 and all newer machines.

Period. Why? good question. It’s based on the fact DNS is hierarchal. Hierarchal meaning it must have multi levels, a minimum of two levels.

The TLD (top level domain) is the root name, such as the com, net, etc., names. The client side resolver service algorithm (which is governed by the DHCP Client service which must be running on all machines, static or not),
relies on that name for the basis to find the second level name (the name “domain” in domain.com, etc.). If the name is a single label name, it thinks THAT name is the TLD.

Therefore it then hits the Internet Root servers to find how owns and is authoritative for that TLD.Such as when looking up Microsoft.com. It queries for the COM portion, which the roots return the nameservers responsible for the COM servers, then it queries for the servers responsible for Microsoft.com zone.

If it’s a single label, the query ends there, and it won’t go further. However what is funny (sic) is that even though the single label name is being hosted locally in DNS, it will NOT query locally first, because it believes it is a TLD, therefore goes through the normal resolution (recursion and devolution) process, which causes excessive query traffic to the internet Root servers.

How to fix it? Good question. Glad you’ve asked.

The preferred “fix” (in a one line summary), is to install a fresh new domain properly named and use ADMT to migrate user, group and computer accounts into the new domain from the current domain.
An alternative is to perform a domain rename, (difficulty depends on the operating system and which version of Exchange is installed).
As a temporary resort, you can use the patch or band aid registry fix to force resolution and registration that is mentioned in the following link. This must be applied to every machine. Unfortunately it must be done on every machine in the domain, including the DCs, member servers, workstations and laptops.

Information About Configuring Windows 2000 for Domains with Single-Label DNS Names:
http://support.microsoft.com/?id=300684

Single Label Names and being a better Internet Neighbor

The following was posted by Microsoft’s Alan Woods in 2004:

Single label names, from Alan Woods, [MSFT], posted:

—– Original Message —–
From: “Alan Wood” [MSFT]
Newsgroups: microsoft.public.win2000.dns
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2004 1:25 PM
Subject: Re: Single label DNS

Hi Roger,

We really would prefer to use FQDN over Single labled. There are
alot of other issues that you can run into when using a Single labeled
domain name with other AD integrated products. Exchange would be a great
example. Also note that the DNR (DNS RESOLVER) was and is designed to
Devolve DNS requests to the LAST 2 names.

Example: Single Labeled domain .domainA
then, you add additional domains on the forest.
child1.domainA
Child2.child1.domainA

If a client in the domain Child2 wants to resolve a name in domainA
Example. Host.DomainA and uses the following to connect to a share
\\host then it is not going to resolve. WHY, because the resolver is
first going to query for first for Host.Child2.child1.domainA, then it
next try HOST.Child1.domainA at that point the Devolution process is
DONE. We only go to the LAST 2 Domain Names.

Also note that if you have a single labeled domain name it causes excess
DNS traffic on the ROOT HINTS servers and being all Good Internet Community
users we definitely do not want to do that. NOTE that in Windows 2003,
you get a big Pop UP Error Message when trying to create a single labeled
name telling you DON’T DO IT. It will still allow you to do it, but you
will still be required to make the registry changes, which is really not
fun.

Microsoft is seriously asking you to NOT do this. We will support you but
it the end results could be limiting as an end results depending on the
services you are using.

Thank you,

Alan Wood[MSFT]

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Summary

I hope this helps!

Published 10/15/2016

Complete List of Technical Blogs: http://www.delawarecountycomputerconsulting.com/technicalblogs.php

This posting is provided AS-IS with no warranties or guarantees and confers no rights.

September 21, 2016September 21, 2016

Delegate Permissions for an OU in Active Directory Users and Computers (ADUC) & Create a Custom MMC, or Just Use RSAT

Updated 9/20/2016

Note- this was put together and fast published and there may be errors. Check back for updates when I add RSAT info.

Prologue

Ace here again. Yep, me again. This scenario comes up time to time. Sure, you can use the RSAT tools, but here an old fashioned, truly tried method that works nicely so a delegated OU admin can only see and do what they need to do in their OU.

Scope

After you Delegate Permissions in to a limited admin in Active Directory, such as the ability to reset passwords, you may want to create a custom ADUC MMC (console or custom taskpad) for the delegated admin to control the portion of AD (the OU) they are allowed or delegated in.

For Windows 2003 AD – but it will work in 2008 and newer

The last time I set this up for a customer, involved a snap-in for each ‘location’ OU, I allowed to retain the rt-click context, and the tree view available in the custom console (left pane and right pane), but I removed everything else including the file menu buttons and such. So under View, Customize, uncheck everything except the top one that says Console Tree. This way they can’t go up level or click any of the things in there. But they will have the right-click feature.

You can also choose to remove the left hand pane (tree view).

MMC v2 and v3 are the same:

Start/run/mmc, hit enter
File, Add-Remove Snap-in, Add ADUC
Drill down under the domain to the OU you want.
Right-click on that OU, choose new window from here.
A new window pops up with the OU in the left pane and the contents in the right pane.
Close the original ADUC window leaving the new window open that you’ve just created.
Expand the window to take up the whole console. – This will keep them in this section and they will not be able to go up levels and are ‘stuck’ in this OU.
Select View/Customize
Uncheck everything but Console Tree.
File/Options Choose Console Mode, then select:

User mode: Limited Access single window
Check: Do not Save Changes to this console
Uncheck: Allow the user to customize views
Save it.

Logon as a test user that was delegated permissions and test it.

If you want to eliminate the ability for the delegated admin to right-click on a user account, uncheck the Console Tree above, then change the console view by right-clicking on the OU, choose New Task View, and choose a vertical or horizontal list, then choose to create a new task, menu command, highlight a user account, choose reset password, or anything else in the right column, choose an icon, and finish.

Copy the .MSC file via a UNC connected to the delegated person’s XP workstation’s \Documents and Settings\username\desktop folder, or if Windows Vista or newer, in the C:\users\username\desktop folder.

Keep in mind, the Active Directory Administration Center, RSAT tools or AdminPak tools, depending on what operating system version the client side is, needs to be installed on the workstation for the ADUC binaries to be available for this task pad to work.

For Windows 2003/Windows XP using the AdminPak tools just for the ADUC snap-in, nothing else:

Copy over the following three DLLS from the 2003 or newer DC you are on, to their client’s system32 folder. All three of these are needed on a 2003 DC or newer, or the ADUC won’t open. However, on an XP or newer machine, you only need two. If I were to allow users to change passwords and create a custom MMC for just that OU, then all I need is adprop.dll and dsadmin.dll, otherwise you need all three.

adprop.dll (for object properties)
dsadmin.dll (ability to alter object properties)
dsprop.dll (for object properties related to directory services)

Then you can use PSEXEC (one of the PSTools available free at Microsoft) to remotely register the DLLs listed below on their workstation using the regsrv32.exe utility.
Download PsExec v1.98, by By Mark Russinovich, Published: April 28, 2009
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx

psexec \\machinename regsvr32 adprop.dll
psexec \\machinename regsvr32 dsadmin.dll
psexec \\machinename regsvr32 dsprop.dll

Here are some screenshots at the following link:

Create Taskpads for Active Directory Operations:
http://www.petri.co.il/create_taskpads_for_ad_operations.htm

===============================================

For AD on Windows 2008 and newer:

You can use the ADAC & RSAT Tools, or you can use the above method.
Note: ADAC does not have a feature to break down specific tools to create a custom console as shown above.

For the Active Directory Administration Center and the RSAT tools:

For the Related links below for the new AD Admin Center. However, the Admin Center does not have the feature to break down just specific tools to create a custom console as shown above.

Active Directory Administration Center (ADAC):

Active Directory Administrative Center: Getting Started
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd560651(WS.10).aspx

Active Directory Administrative Center — the New AD interface
http://techibee.com/active-directory/active-directory-administrative-center-a-new-ad-interface-for-win7-and-win-2008/290

Learn New Features in Active Directory Administrative Center
http://www.enterprisenetworkingplanet.com/windows/article.php/3887136/Learn-New-Features-in-Active-Directory-Administrative-Center.htm

Remote Server Administration Tools (RSAT) for Windows operating systems (Discusses how to install it for all versions of Windows)
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/2693643

Remote Server Administration Tools for Windows 10
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=45520

Customizing – Installing Remote Server Administration Tools (RSAT) for Windows 7
http://www.petri.co.il/remote-server-administration-tools-for-windows-7.htm

Remotely managing your Server Core using RSAT
http://blogs.dirteam.com/blogs/sanderberkouwer/archive/2008/04/27/remotely-managing-your-server-core-using-rsat.aspx
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Summary

I hope this helps!

Last updated – 2/2006, updated 9/20/2016

Complete List of Technical Blogs: http://www.delawarecountycomputerconsulting.com/technicalblogs.php

This posting is provided AS-IS with no warranties or guarantees and confers no rights.

September 21, 2016September 21, 2016

Kerberos Authentication Sequence Across Trusts

Intro

Hey everyone, Ace again. This is a quick publish on how Kerb authentication works across a trust.

Here’s how it works (no shortcut trusts)

The User attempts to access a shared resource on \\FileServer.sales.contoso.com\share.

The following Kerberos V5 authentication process occurs:

a. The GC checks its database about all forest trusts that exist in its forest. If a trust to the target domain is found, it compares the name suffixes listed in the forest trust trusted domain objects (TDOs) to the suffix of the target SPN to find a match.

b. Once a match is found, the global catalog sends the requested information as a referral back to the KDC in marketing.trimagna.com.

3. The KDC in the marketing.trimagna.com then issues the workstation a TGT for the contoso.com domain. This is known as a referral ticket.

4. The workstation then contacts the KDC in the trimagna.com tree root domain to request a referral to the KDC in the sales.contoso.com.

5. The KDC in the trimagna.com domain recognizes the user’s request to establish a session with a resource that exists in a foreign domain’s server.

a. The KDC then issues a TGT for the KDC in the contoso.com domain.

6. The workstation then presents the TGT for the sales.contoso.com domain to the KDC in the contoso.com domain.

a. Once a match is found, the global catalog sends the requested information as a referral back to the KDC in contoso.com.

8. The KDC issues a TGT for the sales.contoso.com domain.

9. The workstation then contacts the KDC of the sales.contoso.com domain and presents the referral ticket it received from its own KDC.

a. The referral ticket is encrypted with the interdomain key that is decrypted by the foreign domain’s TGS.

b. Note: When there is a trust established between two domains, an interdomain key based on the trust password becomes available for authenticating KDC functions, therefore it’s used to encrypt and decrypt tickets.