Stupid spammer is stupid, spamming me his stupid spam.
As far as I can tell, I have had no interactions with either Biscom or Mark Eaton. And yet, he sends me email every couple of months or so, advertising his companyâ€™s product, BDS. I class that as spam, and usually I delete it.
Today, I choose instead to comment on it.
Hereâ€™s the text of his email:
Although widely used as a file transfer method, FTP may leave users non-compliant with some federal and state regulatory requirements. Susceptible to hacking and unauthorized access to private information, FTP is being replaced with more secure file transfer technologies. Companies seeking ways to prevent data breaches and keep confidential information private should consider these FTP risks:
Â» FTP passwords are sent in clear text
Â» Files transferred with FTP are not encrypted
Â» Unpatched FTP servers are vulnerable to malicious attacks
Biscom Delivery Server (BDS) is a secure file transfer solution that enables users to safely exchange and transfer large files while maintaining a complete transaction and audit trail. Because BDS balances an organization’s need for security â€“ encrypting files both at rest and in transit â€“ without requiring knowledge workers to change their accustomed business processes and workflows, workers can manage their own secure and large file delivery needs. See how BDS works.
I would request 15 minutes of your time to mutually explore on a conference call if BDS can meet your current and future file transfer requirements. To schedule a time with me, please view my calendar here or call my direct line at 978-367-3536. Thank you for the opportunity and I look forward to a brief call with you to discuss your requirements in more detail.
Better than most spammers, I suppose, in that he spelled my name correctly. Thatâ€™s about the only correct statement in the entire email, however. Itâ€™s easy to read this and to assume that this salesman and his company are deliberately intending to deceive their customers, but I prefer to assume that he is merely misinformed, or chose his words poorly.
In that vein, hereâ€™s a couple of corrections I offer (I use â€śFTPâ€ť as shorthand for â€śthe FTP protocol and its standard extensionsâ€ť):
- â€śFTP may leave users non-compliantâ€ť
- I have yet to see a standard that states that FTP is banned outright. While FTP is specifically mentioned in the PCI DSS specification, it is always with language such as â€śAn example of an insecure service, protocol, or port is FTP, which passes user credentials in clear-text.â€ť FTP has not required user credentials to be passed in clear text for over a decade. An FTP server with a requirement that all credentials are protected (using encryption, one-time password, or any of the other methods of securing credentials in FTP) would be accepted by PCI auditors, and by PCI analysis tools.
- â€śSusceptible to hacking and unauthorized access to private informationâ€ť
- BDSâ€™s suggested replacement, Biscom, relies on the use of email to send a URL, and HTTPS to retrieve files.
- email is eminently susceptible to hacking, as it is usually sent in the clear (to be fair, there are encryption technologies available for email, but they are seldom used in the kind of environments under discussion)
- HTTPS is most definitely also susceptible to hacking and unauthorised access.
- â€śFTP is being replaced with more secure file transfer technologiesâ€ť
- FTP may be replaced, thatâ€™s for certain, but I have not seen it replaced with more secure, reliable, or standard file transfer technologies.
- Biscom essentially puts an operational framework around the downloading of files from a web server. It doesnâ€™t add any security that FTP is lacking.
- One more secure file transfer technology could be, of course, a more modern FTP server and client, which handles modern definitions of the FTP protocol and its extensions â€“ for instance, the standard for FTP over TLS (and SSL), known as FTPS, which allows for encryption of credential information and file transfers, as well as the use of client and server certificates (as with HTTPS) to mutually authenticate client and server.
- While the FTPS RFC was finalised only in 2005, it had not changed substantially for several years prior to that. WFTPD Pro included functional and interoperable implementations in versions dating back to 2001.
- â€śFTP passwords are sent in clear textâ€ť
- â€śPeople walk out into traffic without lookingâ€ť â€“ equally true, but equally open to misinterpretation. Most people donâ€™t walk out into traffic without looking; most FTP servers are able to refuse clear text logons.
- FTP passwords are sent in clear text in the most naĂŻve implementations of FTP. This is true. But FTP servers have, for a decade and more, been able to use encryption and authentication technologies such as Kerberos, SSL and TLS, to prevent the transmission of passwords in clear text. If passwords are being sent in clear text by an FTP implementation, that is a configuration issue.
- â€śFiles transferred with FTP are not encryptedâ€ť
- Again, for a decade and more, FTP servers have encrypted files using Kerberos, SSL or TLS.
- If your FTP transmission does not encrypt files when it needs to, it is because of faulty configuration.
- â€śUnpatched FTP servers are vulnerable to malicious attacksâ€ť
- So are unpatched HTTP servers; so are unpatched email servers and clients; the very technology on which BDS depends.
- Are unpatched BDS servers invulnerable? I thoroughly doubt that any company could make such a claim.
- â€śBDS [operates] without requiring knowledge workers to change their accustomed business processes and workflowsâ€ť
- â€¦ unless your accustomed business process is to use your FTP server as a secure and appropriate place in which to exchange files.
Finally, some things that BDS canâ€™t, or doesnâ€™t appear to, do, but which are handled with ease by FTP servers. (All of these are based on the â€śHow BDS worksâ€ť page. As such, my understanding is limited, too, but then I am clear in that, and not claiming to be a renowned expert in their protocol. All I can do is go from their freely available material. FTP, by contrast, is a fully documented standard protocol.)
- Accept uploads.
- The description of â€śHow BDS worksâ€ť demonstrates only the manual preparation of a file and sending it to a recipient.
- To allow two-way transfers, it appears that BDS would require each end host their own BDS server. FTP requires only one FTP server, for upload and/or download. Each party could maintain FTP servers, but it isnâ€™t required.
- Automated, or bulk transfers.
- Again, the description of â€śHow BDS worksâ€ť shows emailing a recipient for each file. Are you going to want to do that for a dozen files? Sure, you could zip them up, but the option of downloading an entire directory, or selected files chosen by the recipient, seems to be one you shouldnâ€™t ignore.
- If your recipients need to transfer files that are continually being added to, do you want them to simply log on to an established account, and fetch those files (securely)? In the BDS model, that does not appear to be possible.
- Transfer from regular folders.
- BDS requires that you place the files to be fetched on a specialised server.
- FTP servers access regular files from regular folders. If encryption is required, those folders and files can be encrypted using standard and well-known folder and file-level encryption, such as the Encrypting File System (EFS) supplied for free in Windows, or other solutions for other platforms.
- Reduce transmission overhead
- FTP transmissions are slightly smaller than their equivalent HTTP transmissions, and the same is true of FTPS compared to HTTPS.
- When you add in the email roundtrip thatâ€™s involved, and the human overhead in preparing the file for transmission, thatâ€™s a lot of time and effort that could be spent in just transferring the file.
- Integration with existing identity and authorisation management technology.
- Where FTP relies on using operating system authentication and access control methods, you can use exactly the same methods to control access as you do for controlling access to regular files. It does not seem as though BDS is tied into the operating system in the same way.
- [FTP also usually offers the ability to manage authentication and access control separately from the operating system, should you need to do so]
- Shared files
- If your files need to be shared between a hundred known recipients, BDS appears to require you to create one download for each file, for each recipient. Thatâ€™s a lot of overhead.
- FTP, by comparison, requires you to place the files into a single location that all these users can access. Then send an email to the users (you probably use a distribution list) telling them to go fetch the file.
- Similarly, you can use your own FTP server to host a secure shared file folder for several of your customers. BDS does not offer that feature.
So, all things told, I think that Biscomâ€™s spam was not only unsolicited and unwanted, but itâ€™s also at the very least incorrect and uninformed. The whitepaper they host at http://www.biscomdeliveryserver.com/collateral/wp/BDS-wp-aberdeen-200809.pdf repeats many of these incorrect statements, attributing them to Carol Baroudi of â€śThe Aberdeen Groupâ€ť. What they donâ€™t link to is a later paper from The Aberdeen Groupâ€™s Vice President, Derek Brink, which is tagged as relating to FTPS and FTP â€“ hopefully this means that Derek Brink is a little better informed, possibly as an indirect result of having Ipswitch as one of the paperâ€™s sponsors. Iâ€™d love to read the paper, but at $400, itâ€™s a little steep for a mere blog post.
So, if youâ€™ve been using FTP, and want to move to a more secure file transfer method, donâ€™t bother with the suggestions of a poorly-informed spammer. Simply update your FTP infrastructure if necessary, to a more modern and secure version â€“ then configure it to require SSL / TLS encryption (the FTP over Kerberos implementation documented in RFC 2228, while secure, can have reliability issues), and to require encrypted authentication.
You are then at a stage where you have good quality encrypted and protected file transfer services, often at little or no cost on top of your existing FTP infrastructure, and without having to learn and use a new protocol.
Doubtless there are some features of BDS that make it a winning solution for some companies, but I donâ€™t feel comfortable remaining silent while knowing that itâ€™s being advertised by comparing it ineptly and incorrectly to my chosen favourite secure file transport mechanism.