Stupid spammer is stupid, spamming me his stupid spam.
As far as I can tell, I have had no interactions with either Biscom or Mark Eaton. And yet, he sends me email every couple of months or so, advertising his companyâ€™s product, BDS. I class that as spam, and usually I delete it.
Today, I choose instead to comment on it.
Hereâ€™s the text of his email:
Although widely used as a file transfer method, FTP may leave users non-compliant with some federal and state regulatory requirements. Susceptible to hacking and unauthorized access to private information, FTP is being replaced with more secure file transfer technologies. Companies seeking ways to prevent data breaches and keep confidential information private should consider these FTP risks:
Â» FTP passwords are sent in clear text
Â» Files transferred with FTP are not encrypted
Â» Unpatched FTP servers are vulnerable to malicious attacks
Biscom Delivery Server (BDS) is a secure file transfer solution that enables users to safely exchange and transfer large files while maintaining a complete transaction and audit trail. Because BDS balances an organization’s need for security â€“ encrypting files both at rest and in transit â€“ without requiring knowledge workers to change their accustomed business processes and workflows, workers can manage their own secure and large file delivery needs. See how BDS works.
I would request 15 minutes of your time to mutually explore on a conference call if BDS can meet your current and future file transfer requirements. To schedule a time with me, please view my calendar here or call my direct line at 978-367-3536. Thank you for the opportunity and I look forward to a brief call with you to discuss your requirements in more detail.
Better than most spammers, I suppose, in that he spelled my name correctly. Thatâ€™s about the only correct statement in the entire email, however. Itâ€™s easy to read this and to assume that this salesman and his company are deliberately intending to deceive their customers, but I prefer to assume that he is merely misinformed, or chose his words poorly.
In that vein, hereâ€™s a couple of corrections I offer (I use â€śFTPâ€ť as shorthand for â€śthe FTP protocol and its standard extensionsâ€ť):
Finally, some things that BDS canâ€™t, or doesnâ€™t appear to, do, but which are handled with ease by FTP servers. (All of these are based on the â€śHow BDS worksâ€ť page. As such, my understanding is limited, too, but then I am clear in that, and not claiming to be a renowned expert in their protocol. All I can do is go from their freely available material. FTP, by contrast, is a fully documented standard protocol.)
So, all things told, I think that Biscomâ€™s spam was not only unsolicited and unwanted, but itâ€™s also at the very least incorrect and uninformed. The whitepaper they host at http://www.biscomdeliveryserver.com/collateral/wp/BDS-wp-aberdeen-200809.pdf repeats many of these incorrect statements, attributing them to Carol Baroudi of â€śThe Aberdeen Groupâ€ť. What they donâ€™t link to is a later paper from The Aberdeen Groupâ€™s Vice President, Derek Brink, which is tagged as relating to FTPS and FTP â€“ hopefully this means that Derek Brink is a little better informed, possibly as an indirect result of having Ipswitch as one of the paperâ€™s sponsors. Iâ€™d love to read the paper, but at $400, itâ€™s a little steep for a mere blog post.
So, if youâ€™ve been using FTP, and want to move to a more secure file transfer method, donâ€™t bother with the suggestions of a poorly-informed spammer. Simply update your FTP infrastructure if necessary, to a more modern and secure version â€“ then configure it to require SSL / TLS encryption (the FTP over Kerberos implementation documented in RFC 2228, while secure, can have reliability issues), and to require encrypted authentication.
You are then at a stage where you have good quality encrypted and protected file transfer services, often at little or no cost on top of your existing FTP infrastructure, and without having to learn and use a new protocol.
Doubtless there are some features of BDS that make it a winning solution for some companies, but I donâ€™t feel comfortable remaining silent while knowing that itâ€™s being advertised by comparing it ineptly and incorrectly to my chosen favourite secure file transport mechanism.
(*) By “Unix”, I mean Linux, Unix, AIX, OS/X, and similar flavours.
Way back when, about twenty or so years ago, I was a Unix admin, and a Unix developer. I had to be both, because I was the only person in the company who could spell Unix.
My favourite game was to go along to presentations for Microsoft Windows ‘new features’ and say “Oh, but hasn’t Unix had that for the last twenty years?”
Sure enough, there were countless things that Windows users and developers were just discovering (TCP/IP, shared libraries, multiple sessions on the same computer) that had been in Unix for some time. Linux was yet to make a mention, but as I’ve moved firmly into the Windows world, and left Unix behind, I’ve pretty much assumed that technologically speaking, if Windows has it, Unix and the like must also have the same functionality.
As I re-engage with Unix and Linux developers and IT professionals in recent months, though, I can see that there are some areas – particularly in security – where Windows is far ahead of the *x operating systems. Here’s a few:
Maybe I’m missing some huge advances, and maybe some of these issues are resolved with a third-party tool – but then, maybe that’s part of the problem too. All of the above are a part of the operating system in Windows, and can be relied on to exist by developers, and their use by applications can be expected by IT professionals.
[Disclaimer: Yes, I know there are still areas where Microsoft needs to learn from Unix and Linux, and perhaps it’d be good if you’d educate me on those, too. This isn’t a “Windows is better than *X” debate, it’s a “hey, even if you think *X is better than Windows, here are some areas *X needs improving in”.]
Edit: There have been some excellent comments posted overnight in response to this article, and as I had hoped, I am mostly still ‘in the dark’ about what Linux and Unix-like systems offers. I’ll be looking at these as I have time, and responding when I can. For now, just let me say that I am impressed to see so much technical content in the responses, and so little of the “fanboy” behaviour that often characterises these discussions.
Recently I discussed using EFS as a simple, yet reliable, form of file encryption. Among the doubts raised was the following from an article by fellow MVP Deb Shinder on EFS:
EFS generates a self-signed certificate. However, there are problems inherent in using self-signed certificates:
- Unlike a certificate issued by a trusted third party (CA), a self-signed certificate signifies only self-trust. Itâ€™s sort of like relying on an ID card created by its bearer, rather than a government-issued card. Since encrypted files arenâ€™t shared with anyone else, this isnâ€™t really as much of a problem as it might at first appear, but itâ€™s not the only problem.
- If the self-signed certificateâ€™s key becomes corrupted or gets deleted, the files that have been encrypted with it canâ€™t be decrypted. The user canâ€™t request a new certificate as he could do with a CA.
Well, she’s right, but that only really gives a part of the picture, and it verges on out-and-out recommending that self-signed certificates are completely untrustworthy. Certainly that’s how self-signed certificates are often viewed.
Let’s take the second item first, shall we?
“Request a new certificate” isn’t quite as simple as all that. If the user has deleted, or corrupted, the private key, and didn’t save a copy, then requesting a new certificate will merely allow the user to encrypt new files, and won’t let them recover old files. [The exception is, of course, if you use something called “Key Recovery” at your certificate authority (CA) – but that’s effectively an automated “save a copy”.]
Even renewing a certificate changes its thumbprint, so to decrypt your old EFS-encrypted files, you should keep your old EFS certificates and private keys around, or use CIPHER to re-encrypt with current certificates.
So, the second point is dependent on whether the CA has set up Key Recovery – this isn’t a problem if you make a copy of your certificate and private key, onto removable storage. And keep it very carefully stored away.
As to the first point – you (or rather, your computer) already trust dozens of self-signed certificates. Without them, Windows Update would not work, nor would many of the secured web sites that you use on a regular basis.
Hey, look – they’ve all got the same thing in “Issued To” as they have in “Issued By”!
Yes, that’s right – every single “Trusted Root” certificate is self-signed!
If you’re new to PKI and cryptography, that’s going to seem weird – but a moment’s thought should set you at rest.
Every certificate must be signed. There must be a “first certificate” in any chain of signed certificates, and if that “first certificate” is signed by anyone other than itself, then it’s not the first certificate. QED.
The reason we trust any non-root certificate is that we trust the issuer to choose to sign only those certificates whose identity can be validated according to their policy.
So, if we can’t trust these trusted roots because of who they’re signed by, why should we trust them?
The reason we trust self-signed certificates is that we have a reason to trust them – and that reason is outside of the certificate and its signature. The majority (perhaps all) of the certificates in your Trusted Root Certificate Store come from Microsoft – they didn’t originate there, but they were distributed by Microsoft along with the operating system, and updates to the operating system.
You trusted the operating system’s original install disks implicitly, and that trust is where the trust for the Trusted Root certificates is rooted. That’s a trust outside of the certificate chains themselves.
So, based on that logic, you can trust the self-signed certificates that EFS issues in the absence of a CA, only if there is something outside of the certificate itself that you trust.
What could that be?
For me, it’s simple – I trust the operating system to generate the certificate, and I trust my operational processes that keep the private key associated with the EFS certificate secure.
There are other reasons to be concerned about using the self-signed EFS certificates that are generated in the absence of a CA, though, and I’ll address those in the next post on this topic.